Done with day 2!
I was wrong, totally wrong, when i started the bootcamp thinking that this would not be useful . I am learning every minute of this bootcamp and i’m really happy i decided to try it out !
Here are the notes for Bootcamp- Day 2 . Hope you find it useful
ZONE BASED FIREWALL
- An interface can only be in a single zone
- Unless we have a policy on the self-zone, the default behavior is that the traffic destined to the router, is permitted
- Traffic cannot flow between a zone-member and a non zone-member
- The ZPF service policies have the following actiobns
- pass -> permit unidirectional traffic
- inspect -> stateful inspection
- drop -> block
- You can’t configure SPI(CBAC) and ZPF for the same set of interfaces. But you can do it for different sets
- Auth-proxy and stuff arent supported by the ZPF, they’re still done using SPI
- IN ZPF, if we have interface ACL’s, then the ZPF doesn’t open “pinholes’in them. If the ACL’s are configured for block, then the traffic is blocked.
- We use a class-map of the type “inspect” to tell the IOS that this is a class-map to be used with ZPF
- You can test by putting both the interfaces in the same-zone ( all traffic will be permitted )
- Understand the difference between ” sh ip port-map ” and “sh ip nbar port-map”
- By specifying an ACL at the end of the “ip port-map ” command, we can specify the destination IP which has to be accessed using the special ports
- ex : ip port-map http port tcp 8080 list 10
- For overriding the default port, we require a host-specific PAM mapping
- ex : access-list 10 permit host 192.168.1.1
- ip port-map http port 25 list 10
- Here, only for host 192.168.1.1 , HTTP runs on tcp port 25
- After I finished this section, I read this document. It was very helpfulJ http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_data_plane/configuration/guide/sec_zone_polcy_firew_ps6441_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html#wp1055217
IPSEC VPNs
- Why IPSec VPNs over other type of VPNs?
- Does not need static SP provisioning like FR/ATM/MPLS
- Independant of SP access method
- Allows both site-to-site and remote-accesss ( IPsec is always on, v/s dial-on-demand )
- Data is protected. ( main motivation )
- IPSec as a suite offers
- Data origin authentication
- Data integrity
- Data confidentiality
- Anti-replay
- The advantage of using UDP 500 for both the source and destination ports, is useful during NAT-D
- ISAKMP peers must agree on
- Authentication method
- Encryption type
- hash algo
- DH group
- Lifetimes need not match ( the lower one is dynamically chosen )
- Remember, the phase 1 config is only used to setup a secure channel through the network for the exchange of IPSec configuration data.
- Default policy : 65535
- IPSec peers ( IPSec sa a.k.a IKE Phase 2 ) must agree on
- Transform set to match
- In an L2L Vpn, the VPN_ACLs are exchanged and they need to match.( they need to be mirror images of each other )
- Do not use “any any” for the ACL. Always try and specify the exact networks
- IPSec SA rekeying can also include PFS
- Runs another DH exchange ( more secure )
- During configuration on the lab, make sure that the traffic ( both UDP 500 and ESP ) between the 2 VPN routers passes freely .( take care of any Firewalls , IOS FW , SPI configured in previous tasks )
- Ensure that we can have the VPN initiate from both sides ( testing before moving on to the next task. If you have a doubt, as the proctor )
- Certificate based authentication
- If Certificate based Authentictation is’nt working, try doing PSK auth and see if it works
- When using certificates for ISAKMP authentication, ensure that CA server (port 80) is reachable by the clients and ensure that the time is synced.
- If you don’t have NTP, ensure that the client is set to a time, slightly ahead of the server. ( if you can’t exactly sync them )
- Also check the time-zones
MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES
- Advantage of using GRE for VPN’s -> passing multicast(routing) traffic
- Disadvantage -> Overhead
- Solution -> VTI
- also better interop with other vendors not supporting GRE
- less overhead
- Dynamic VTI
- virtual template configured with interface type “tunnel”
- The virtual template acts as a logical interface
- In case of ZBF, the virtual template can be assigned to zones ( this just acts like a normal interface )
- IPSEC HA
- Link resiliency
- If i have 2 devices, and 2 links between them, if one fails, traffic can flow through the other links
- Backup peers
- if one peer fails, the secondary peer is used
- HSRP / RRI
- if this is configured, then the HSRP address is used instead of the peer IP.
- GRE w/IPSEC, dynamic routing
- Link resiliency
- QOS for VPN
- QOS for encrypted traffic
- This is the default type of QOS
- QOS for unencrypted traffic
- we use the QOS pre-classify configured on the virtual template, crypto map or GRE tunnel to classify the traffic prior to encryption
- QOS for encrypted traffic
- We can encrypt the ISAKMP keys ( to prevent them from being seen in the running-config in plaintext)
- “password encryption aes”
- “key config-key password-encrypt”
- Encrypts the ISAKMP keys using Type-6 AES
- We can also configure Certificate MAPS to ignore revocation checks as well as expired certificates. This can be configured when we “match” the certificate MAP under the trustpoint
- match certificate TEST allow expired-certificate
- match certificate TEST skip revocation-check
- This scenario is useful when the CA to be used by one peer is behind the remote-peer and it can be reached only after establishing the VPN
- In this situation, we can configure the certificate MAP to allow expired-certificates,ignore revocation checks
- Clearing the DF bit
- We can set/clear the DF bit on the IPSec traffic ( to allow/deny fragmentation of the traffic )
- This is for the traffic passing through the Router
- can be done globally or on an interface
- Fragmentation
- We can fragment before/after we encrypt
- Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption
- if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks
- crypto ipsec fragmentation before-encryption
- if we fragment after encryption, then the other end ( remote peer ) has to do both reassembly and decryption
- crypto ipsec fragmentation after-encryption
- if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks
- Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption
- We can fragment before/after we encrypt
- Anti-replay
- Keeps track of sequence numbers. Default window size is 64
- crypto ipsec security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]
- (or )
- crypto map MYMAP
- set security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]
DMVPN
- It allows an on-demand full mesh IPSec tunnels
- Instead of n*(n-1)/2 static tunnel configurations, we have 1 mGRE interface for all connections
- Always remember, ISAKMP Phase 1 is still required.
- In case of the HUB mgre interface, we have Tunnel source.
- If we wanna force all the spokes to send traffic through the HUB ( DMVPN type 1 ) , then we can also specify the tunnel destination
- The IGP which we will be using here is an OVERLAY network ( independant of the real routing protocols running in the network )
- If you’re using OSPF , use the same network types for the hubs and the spokes
- if there is a DR election, ensure that the Hub becomes the DR.
- This is achieved by setting the “priority” to 0 on the spokes.
- With EIGRP
- One of the issues is split-horizon , on the mgre interface . Issue the “no ip split-horizon eigrp # “
- Hub by default re-writes the next-hop for all the advertised routes to itself.
- So if we want spoke-to-spoke tunnels, disable this feature by using ” no ip next-hop-self eigrp # “
- Phase 3 DMVPN
- Configuration
- ip nhrp redirect
- ip nhrp shortcut
- creates NHRP entries for remote networks
- Configuration
- Interesting traffic
- we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )
- ip nhrp interest 101
- we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )
- Groups
- ip nhrp group A ( spoke )
- ip nhrp map group A service-policy output TEST ( hub )
- can have separate service policies configured outbound for different hosts.
- Watch out for recursive routing issues.
Day 3 , here i come!
Cheers,
TacACK
terface can only be in a single zone
Unless we have a policy on the self-zone, the default behavior is that the traffic destined to the router, is permitted
Traffic cannot flow between a zone-member and a non zone-member
The ZPF service policies have the following actiobns
pass -> permit unidirectional traffic
inspect -> stateful inspection
drop -> block
You can’t configure SPI(CBAC) and ZPF for the same set of interfaces. But you can do it for different sets
Auth-proxy and stuff arent supported by the ZPF, they’re still done using SPI
IN ZPF, if we have interface ACL’s, then the ZPF doesn’t open “pinholes’in them. If the ACL’s are configured for block, then the traffic is blocked.
We use a class-map of the type “inspect” to tell the IOS that this is a class-map to be used with ZPF
You can test by putting both the interfaces in the same-zone ( all traffic will be permitted )
Understand the difference between ” sh ip port-map ” and “sh ip nbar port-map”
By specifying an ACL at the end of the “ip port-map ” command, we can specify the destination IP which has to be accessed using the special ports
ex : ip port-map http port tcp 8080 list 10
For overriding the default port, we require a host-specific PAM mapping
ex : access-list 10 permit host 192.168.1.1
#ip port-map http port 25 list 10
Here, only for host 192.168.1.1 , HTTP runs on tcp port 25
IPSEC VPNs
Why IPSec VPNs over other type of VPNs?
Does not need static SP provisioning like FR/ATM/MPLS
Independant of SP access method
Allows both site-to-site and remote-accesss ( IPsec is always on, v/s dial-on-demand )
Data is protected. ( main motivation )
IPSec as a suite offers
Data origin authentication
Data integrity
Data confidentiality
Anti-replay
The advantage of using UDP 500 for both the source and destination ports, is useful during NAT-D
ISAKMP peers must agree on
Authentication method
Encryption type
hash algo
DH group
Lifetimes need not match ( the lower one is dynamically chosen )
Remember, the phase 1 config is only used to setup a secure channel through the network for the exchange of IPSec configuration data.
Default policy : 65535
IPSec peers ( IPSec sa a.k.a IKE Phase 2 ) must agree on
Transform set to match
In an L2L Vpn, the VPN_ACLs are exchanged and they need to match.( they need to be mirror images of each other )
Do not use “any any” for the ACL. Always try and specify the exact networks
IPSec SA rekeying can also include PFS
Runs another DH exchange ( more secure )
During configuration on the lab, make sure that the traffic ( both UDP 500 and ESP ) between the 2 VPN routers passes freely .( take care of any Firewalls , IOS FW , SPI configured in previous tasks )
Ensure that we can have the VPN initiate from both sides ( testing before moving on to the next task. If you have a doubt, as the proctor )
Certificate based authentication
If Certificate based Authentictation is’nt working, try doing PSK auth and see if it works
When using certificates for ISAKMP authentication, ensure that CA server (port 80) is reachable by the clients and ensure that the time is synced.
If you don’t have NTP, ensure that the client is set to a time, slightly ahead of the server. ( if you can’t exactly sync them )
Also check the time-zones
MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES
Advantage of using GRE for VPN’s -> passing multicast(routing) traffic
Disadvantage -> Overhead
Solution -> VTI
also better interop with other vendors not supporting GRE
less overhead
Dynamic VTI
virtual template configured with interface type “tunnel”
The virtual template acts as a logical interface
In case of ZBF, the virtual template can be assigned to zones ( this just acts like a normal interface )
IPSEC HA
Link resiliency
If i have 2 devices, and 2 links between them, if one fails, traffic can flow through the other links
Backup peers
if one peer fails, the secondary peer is used
HSRP / RRI
if this is configured, then the HSRP address is used instead of the peer IP.
GRE w/IPSEC, dynamic routing
QOS for VPN
QOS for encrypted traffic
This is the default type of QOS
QOS for unencrypted traffic
we use the QOS pre-classify configured on the virtual template, crypto map or GRE tunnel
We can encrypt the ISAKMP keys ( to prevent them from being seen in the running-config in plaintext)
“password encryption aes”
“key config-key password-encrypt”
Encrypts the ISAKMP keys using Type-6 AES
We can also configure Certificate MAPS to ignore revocation checks as well as expired certificates. This can be configured when we “match” the certificate MAP under the trustpoint
match certificate TEST allow expired-certificate
match certificate TEST skip revocation-check
This scenario is useful when the CA to be used by one peer is behind the remote-peer and it can be reached only after establishing the VPN
In this situation, we can configure the certificate MAP to allow expired-certificates,ignore revocation checks
Clearing the DF bit
We can set/clear the DF bit on the IPSec traffic ( to allow/deny fragmentation of the traffic )
This is for the traffic passing through the Router
can be done globally or on an interface
Fragmentation
We can fragment before/after we encrypt
Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption
if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks
crypto ipsec fragmentation before-encryption
if we fragment after encryption, then the other end ( remote peer ) has to do both reassembly and decryption
crypto ipsec fragmentation after-encryption
Anti-replay
Keeps track of sequence numbers. Default window size is 64
crypto ipsec security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]
(or )
crypto map MYMAP
set security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]
DMVPN
It allows an on-demand full mesh IPSec tunnels
Instead of n*(n-1)/2 static tunnel configurations, we have 1 mGRE interface for all connections
Always remember, ISAKMP Phase 1 is still required.
In case of the HUB mgre interface, we have Tunnel source.
If we wanna force all the spokes to send traffic through the HUB ( DMVPN type 1 ) , then we can also specify the tunnel destination
The IGP which we will be using here is an OVERLAY network ( independant of the real routing protocols running in the network )
If you’re using OSPF , use the same network types for the hubs and the spokes
if there is a DR election, ensure that the Hub becomes the DR.
This is achieved by setting the “priority” to 0 on the spokes.
With EIGRP
One of the issues is split-horizon , on the mgre interface . Issue the “no ip split-horizon eigrp # “
Hub by default re-writes the next-hop for all the advertised routes to itself.
So if we want spoke-to-spoke tunnels, disable this feature by using ” no ip next-hop-self eigrp # “
Phase 3 DMVPN
Configuration
ip nhrp redirect
ip nhrp shortcut
creates NHRP entries for remote networks
Interesting traffic
we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )
ip nhrp interest 101
Groups
ip nhrp group A ( spoke )
ip nhrp map group A service-policy output TEST ( hub )
can have separate service policies configured outbound for different hosts.
Watch out for recursive routing issues.
Right on! Done with Day 2 of the Bootcamp. Was pretty good..definitely exceeded my expectations. Can’t wait for tomorrow!
