T-22 | Bootcamp Day 2 Review


Done with day 2! :)   I was wrong, totally wrong, when i started the bootcamp thinking that this would not be useful . I am learning every minute of this bootcamp and i’m really happy i decided to try it out !

Here are the notes for Bootcamp- Day 2 . Hope you find it useful :)

ZONE BASED FIREWALL

  • An interface can only be in a single zone
  • Unless we have a policy on the self-zone, the default behavior is that the traffic destined to the router, is permitted
  • Traffic cannot flow between a zone-member and a non zone-member
  • The ZPF service policies have the following actiobns
    • pass -> permit unidirectional traffic
    • inspect -> stateful inspection
    • drop -> block
  • You can’t configure SPI(CBAC) and ZPF for the same set of interfaces. But you can do it for different sets
  • Auth-proxy and stuff arent supported by the ZPF, they’re still done using SPI
  • IN ZPF, if we have interface ACL’s, then the ZPF doesn’t open “pinholes’in them. If the ACL’s are configured for block, then the traffic is blocked.
  • We use a class-map of the type “inspect” to tell the IOS that this is a class-map to be used with ZPF
  • You can test by putting both the interfaces in the same-zone ( all traffic will be permitted )
  • Understand the difference between ” sh ip port-map ” and “sh ip nbar port-map”
  • By specifying an ACL at the end of the “ip port-map ” command, we can specify the destination IP which has to be accessed using the special ports
    • ex : ip port-map http port tcp 8080 list 10
  • For overriding the default port, we require a host-specific PAM mapping
    • ex : access-list 10 permit host 192.168.1.1
    • ip port-map http port 25 list 10
  • Here, only for host 192.168.1.1 , HTTP runs on tcp port 25
  • After I finished this section, I read this document. It was very helpfulJ http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_data_plane/configuration/guide/sec_zone_polcy_firew_ps6441_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html#wp1055217

IPSEC VPNs

  • Why IPSec VPNs over other type of VPNs?
    • Does not need static SP provisioning like FR/ATM/MPLS
    • Independant of SP access method
    • Allows both site-to-site and remote-accesss ( IPsec is always on, v/s dial-on-demand )
    • Data is protected. ( main motivation )
  • IPSec as a suite offers
    • Data origin authentication
    • Data integrity
    • Data confidentiality
    • Anti-replay
  • The advantage of using UDP 500 for both the source and destination ports, is useful during NAT-D
  • ISAKMP peers must agree on
    • Authentication method
    • Encryption type
    • hash algo
    • DH group
  • Lifetimes need not match ( the lower one is dynamically chosen )
  • Remember, the phase 1 config is only used to setup a secure channel through the network for the exchange of IPSec configuration data.
  • Default policy : 65535
  • IPSec peers ( IPSec sa a.k.a IKE Phase 2 ) must agree on
    • Transform set to match
    • In an L2L Vpn, the VPN_ACLs are exchanged and they need to match.( they need to be mirror images of each other )
  • Do not use “any any” for the ACL. Always try and specify the exact networks
  • IPSec SA rekeying can also include PFS
    • Runs another DH exchange ( more secure )
  • During configuration on the lab, make sure that the traffic ( both UDP 500 and ESP ) between the 2 VPN routers passes freely .( take care of any Firewalls , IOS FW , SPI configured in previous tasks )
  • Ensure that we can have the VPN initiate from both sides ( testing before moving on to the next task. If you have a doubt, as the proctor )
  • Certificate based authentication
    • If Certificate based Authentictation is’nt working, try doing PSK auth and see if it works
    • When using certificates for ISAKMP authentication, ensure that CA server (port 80) is reachable by the clients and ensure that the time is synced.
    • If you don’t have NTP, ensure that the client is set to a time, slightly ahead of the server. ( if you can’t exactly sync them )
    • Also check the time-zones

MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES

  • Advantage of using GRE for VPN’s -> passing multicast(routing) traffic
  • Disadvantage -> Overhead
  • Solution -> VTI
    • also better interop with other vendors not supporting GRE
    • less overhead
  • Dynamic VTI
    • virtual template configured with interface type “tunnel”
    • The virtual template acts as a logical interface
  • In case of ZBF, the virtual template can be assigned to zones ( this just acts like a normal interface )
  • IPSEC HA
    • Link resiliency
      • If i have 2 devices, and 2 links between them, if one fails, traffic can flow through the other links
    • Backup peers
      • if one peer fails, the secondary peer is used
    • HSRP / RRI
      • if this is configured, then the HSRP address is used instead of the peer IP.
    • GRE w/IPSEC, dynamic routing
  • QOS for VPN
    • QOS for encrypted traffic
      • This is the default type of QOS
    • QOS for unencrypted traffic
      • we use the QOS pre-classify configured on the virtual template, crypto map or GRE tunnel to classify the traffic prior to encryption
  • We can encrypt the ISAKMP keys ( to prevent them from being seen in the running-config in plaintext)
    • “password encryption aes”
    • “key config-key password-encrypt”
  • Encrypts the ISAKMP keys using Type-6 AES
  • We can also configure Certificate MAPS to ignore revocation checks as well as expired certificates. This can be configured when we “match” the certificate MAP under the trustpoint
    • match certificate TEST allow expired-certificate
    • match certificate TEST skip revocation-check
  • This scenario is useful when the CA to be used by one peer is behind the remote-peer and it can be reached only after establishing the VPN
  • In this situation, we can configure the certificate MAP to allow expired-certificates,ignore revocation checks
  • Clearing the DF bit
    • We can set/clear the DF bit on the IPSec traffic ( to allow/deny fragmentation of the traffic )
    • This is for the traffic passing through the Router
    • can be done globally or on an interface
  • Fragmentation
    • We can fragment before/after we encrypt
      • Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption
        • if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks
          • crypto ipsec fragmentation before-encryption
        • if we fragment after encryption, then the other end ( remote peer ) has to do both reassembly and decryption
          • crypto ipsec fragmentation after-encryption
  • Anti-replay
    • Keeps track of sequence numbers. Default window size is 64
    • crypto ipsec security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]
    • (or )
    • crypto map MYMAP
      • set security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]

DMVPN

  • It allows an on-demand full mesh IPSec tunnels
  • Instead of n*(n-1)/2 static tunnel configurations, we have 1 mGRE interface for all connections
  • Always remember, ISAKMP Phase 1 is still required.
  • In case of the HUB mgre interface, we have Tunnel source.
  • If we wanna force all the spokes to send traffic through the HUB ( DMVPN type 1 ) , then we can also specify the tunnel destination
  • The IGP which we will be using here is an OVERLAY network ( independant of the real routing protocols running in the network )
  • If you’re using OSPF , use the same network types for the hubs and the spokes
    • if there is a DR election, ensure that the Hub becomes the DR.
    • This is achieved by setting the “priority” to 0 on the spokes.
  • With EIGRP
    • One of the issues is split-horizon , on the mgre interface . Issue the “no ip split-horizon eigrp # “
    • Hub by default re-writes the next-hop for all the advertised routes to itself.
    • So if we want spoke-to-spoke tunnels, disable this feature by using ” no ip next-hop-self eigrp # “
  • Phase 3 DMVPN
    • Configuration
      • ip nhrp redirect
      • ip nhrp shortcut
    • creates NHRP entries for remote networks
  • Interesting traffic
    • we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )
      • ip nhrp interest 101
  • Groups
    • ip nhrp group A ( spoke )
    • ip nhrp map group A service-policy output TEST ( hub )
    • can have separate service policies configured outbound for different hosts.
  • Watch out for recursive routing issues.

Day 3 , here i come!

Cheers,

TacACK

terface can only be in a single zone

Unless we have a policy on the self-zone, the default behavior is that the traffic destined to the router, is permitted

Traffic cannot flow between a zone-member and a non zone-member

The ZPF service policies have the following actiobns

pass -> permit unidirectional traffic

inspect -> stateful inspection

drop -> block

You can’t configure SPI(CBAC) and ZPF for the same set of interfaces. But you can do it for different sets

Auth-proxy and stuff arent supported by the ZPF, they’re still done using SPI

IN ZPF, if we have interface ACL’s, then the ZPF doesn’t open “pinholes’in them. If the ACL’s are configured for block, then the traffic is blocked.

We use a class-map of the type “inspect” to tell the IOS that this is a class-map to be used with ZPF

You can test by putting both the interfaces in the same-zone ( all traffic will be permitted )

Understand the difference between ” sh ip port-map ” and “sh ip nbar port-map”

By specifying an ACL at the end of the “ip port-map ” command, we can specify the destination IP which has to be accessed using the special ports

ex : ip port-map http port tcp 8080 list 10

For overriding the default port, we require a host-specific PAM mapping

ex : access-list 10 permit host 192.168.1.1

#ip port-map http port 25 list 10

Here, only for host 192.168.1.1 , HTTP runs on tcp port 25

Reading http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_data_plane/configuration/guide/sec_zone_polcy_firew_ps6441_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html#wp1055217 now

IPSEC VPNs

Why IPSec VPNs over other type of VPNs?

Does not need static SP provisioning like FR/ATM/MPLS

Independant of SP access method

Allows both site-to-site and remote-accesss ( IPsec is always on, v/s dial-on-demand )

Data is protected. ( main motivation )

IPSec as a suite offers

Data origin authentication

Data integrity

Data confidentiality

Anti-replay

The advantage of using UDP 500 for both the source and destination ports, is useful during NAT-D

ISAKMP peers must agree on

Authentication method

Encryption type

hash algo

DH group

Lifetimes need not match ( the lower one is dynamically chosen )

Remember, the phase 1 config is only used to setup a secure channel through the network for the exchange of IPSec configuration data.

Default policy : 65535

IPSec peers ( IPSec sa a.k.a IKE Phase 2 ) must agree on

Transform set to match

In an L2L Vpn, the VPN_ACLs are exchanged and they need to match.( they need to be mirror images of each other )

Do not use “any any” for the ACL. Always try and specify the exact networks

IPSec SA rekeying can also include PFS

Runs another DH exchange ( more secure )

During configuration on the lab, make sure that the traffic ( both UDP 500 and ESP ) between the 2 VPN routers passes freely .( take care of any Firewalls , IOS FW , SPI configured in previous tasks )

Ensure that we can have the VPN initiate from both sides ( testing before moving on to the next task. If you have a doubt, as the proctor )

Certificate based authentication

If Certificate based Authentictation is’nt working, try doing PSK auth and see if it works

When using certificates for ISAKMP authentication, ensure that CA server (port 80) is reachable by the clients and ensure that the time is synced.

If you don’t have NTP, ensure that the client is set to a time, slightly ahead of the server. ( if you can’t exactly sync them )

Also check the time-zones

MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES

Advantage of using GRE for VPN’s -> passing multicast(routing) traffic

Disadvantage -> Overhead

Solution -> VTI

also better interop with other vendors not supporting GRE

less overhead

Dynamic VTI

virtual template configured with interface type “tunnel”

The virtual template acts as a logical interface

In case of ZBF, the virtual template can be assigned to zones ( this just acts like a normal interface )

IPSEC HA

Link resiliency

If i have 2 devices, and 2 links between them, if one fails, traffic can flow through the other links

Backup peers

if one peer fails, the secondary peer is used

HSRP / RRI

if this is configured, then the HSRP address is used instead of the peer IP.

GRE w/IPSEC, dynamic routing

QOS for VPN

QOS for encrypted traffic

This is the default type of QOS

QOS for unencrypted traffic

we use the QOS pre-classify configured on the virtual template, crypto map or GRE tunnel

We can encrypt the ISAKMP keys ( to prevent them from being seen in the running-config in plaintext)

“password encryption aes”

“key config-key password-encrypt”

Encrypts the ISAKMP keys using Type-6 AES

We can also configure Certificate MAPS to ignore revocation checks as well as expired certificates. This can be configured when we “match” the certificate MAP under the trustpoint

match certificate TEST allow expired-certificate

match certificate TEST skip revocation-check

This scenario is useful when the CA to be used by one peer is behind the remote-peer and it can be reached only after establishing the VPN

In this situation, we can configure the certificate MAP to allow expired-certificates,ignore revocation checks

Clearing the DF bit

We can set/clear the DF bit on the IPSec traffic ( to allow/deny fragmentation of the traffic )

This is for the traffic passing through the Router

can be done globally or on an interface

Fragmentation

We can fragment before/after we encrypt

Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption

if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks

crypto ipsec fragmentation before-encryption

if we fragment after encryption, then the other end ( remote peer ) has to do both reassembly and decryption

crypto ipsec fragmentation after-encryption

Anti-replay

Keeps track of sequence numbers. Default window size is 64

crypto ipsec security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]

(or )

crypto map MYMAP

set security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]

DMVPN

It allows an on-demand full mesh IPSec tunnels

Instead of n*(n-1)/2 static tunnel configurations, we have 1 mGRE interface for all connections

Always remember, ISAKMP Phase 1 is still required.

In case of the HUB mgre interface, we have Tunnel source.

If we wanna force all the spokes to send traffic through the HUB ( DMVPN type 1 ) , then we can also specify the tunnel destination

The IGP which we will be using here is an OVERLAY network ( independant of the real routing protocols running in the network )

If you’re using OSPF , use the same network types for the hubs and the spokes

if there is a DR election, ensure that the Hub becomes the DR.

This is achieved by setting the “priority” to 0 on the spokes.

With EIGRP

One of the issues is split-horizon , on the mgre interface . Issue the “no ip split-horizon eigrp # “

Hub by default re-writes the next-hop for all the advertised routes to itself.

So if we want spoke-to-spoke tunnels, disable this feature by using ” no ip next-hop-self eigrp # “

Phase 3 DMVPN

Configuration

ip nhrp redirect

ip nhrp shortcut

creates NHRP entries for remote networks

Interesting traffic

we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )

ip nhrp interest 101

Groups

ip nhrp group A ( spoke )

ip nhrp map group A service-policy output TEST ( hub )

can have separate service policies configured outbound for different hosts.

Watch out for recursive routing issues.

Right on! Done with Day 2 of the Bootcamp. Was pretty good..definitely exceeded my expectations. Can’t wait for tomorrow! :)

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