Archive for March 10th, 2010
T-18 | Bootcamp Final Day Review
Posted by TacAck in 90 Day countdown on March 10th, 2010
I’m going to miss Marvin
Here are the notes for the final day of the bootcamp .
L2 SECURITY
- Violation modes of port-security
- Shutdown
- send port to err-disable
- Protect
- Violators cannot send traffic in , no alert is raised
- Restrict
- Violators cannot send traffic in
- Generates SNMP/ Syslog
- HSRP uses 2 MAC addresses ( NOTE )
- During configuration, check if some traffic might inadvertantly trigger this port-security feature.
- Shutdown
- 2 ways to recover a port from err-disable
- err-disable recovery configured
- shut/no-shut
- We can also configure a static ” Null route” a MAC address
- When we block multicast, then some unicast/broadcast traffic also gets blocked in Storm-control ( read more on this )
- “switchport protected” -> Mini PVLAN like configuration
- When configuring VLAN Maps, ensure that ARP traffic is allowed ( most of the time, this is needed )
- PVLAN requires Transparent ( VTP ) mode configuration on the switch
ATTACK MITIGATION
- VLAN HOPPING ATTACK
- 2 variations
- Hosts runs DTP to form a trunk with the adjacent switch
- Host sends frames double tagged with 802.1q
- Mitigation
- Ensure that all host-facing ports are statically assigned as access ports (switchport mode access )
- Don’t ever use VLAN 1 as the default VLAN
- 2 variations
- CAM TABLE ATTACKS
- port-security -> Mitigation
- Shutting down the port is the best option
- DHCP STARVATION ATTACKS
- Tons of DHCP requests exhaust the DHCP pool.
- Victim hosts are starved of a DHCP lease.
- Could be a DOS/ MITM attack
- Mitigation
- DHCP Snooping
- Ensure that all switches running a the particular VLAN have DHCP snooping turned on ( talk to the proctor )
- ROGUE DHCP SERVER ATTACK
- Mitigation : DHCP Snooping ( trust )
- Can also use Port ACLs/VACLs
- We can also use the “ip dhcp snooping Limit” command to limit the flood.
- Mitigation : DHCP Snooping ( trust )
- ARP SPOOFING
- Gratuitous ARP -> Send ARP replies regularly without valid requests ( to refresh the ARP caches of the devices )
- This can be a good playground to lauch MITM attacks
- Mitigation
- DHCP snooping with DAI
- or ARP acls with DAI ( for static IP addressing )
- If switches don’t support snooping or ARP inspection
- IP ARP uses ethertype 0×806
- IP uses Ethertype 0×800
- This can be used to block the ARP traffic
- Bad configuration of this can cause problems later ( reload, reboot ,etc ) . So remember, it won’t immediately show up due to ARP caching on the devices
- MAC SPOOFING
- Mitigation
- IP Source guard
- Consults the DHCP Snooping table
- We can also use port-security
- IP Source guard
- Mitigation
- IP SPOOFING
- Mitigation
- RFC 1918/2827/3330 BOGON ingress filtering
- uRPF
- RFC 2827 is bidirectional
- Traffic leaving should have the internal address
- Traffic entering from the outside, should not have the internal address
- uRPF takes into consideration all equal cost paths(urpf accepts both the paths as the reverse path ) into consideration when determining the interface upon which a packet should be received on . It even understands EIGRP unequal cost load-balancing.
- Mitigation
- SMURF/FRAGGLE ATTACK
- Mitigation -> no ip directed broadcast
- uRPF also does the job
- via CAR/MQC
- via Blackholing ( either source/destination based )
- Mitigation -> no ip directed broadcast
STANDARD BLACKHOLE FILTERING
- Problem is legit traffic to the destination also gets blocked
- Matches only by destination
- Ensure that the “no ip unreachables” is configured on the Edge -routers
SOURCE-BASED BLACKHOLE FILTERING
- There is a uRPF statement on the EDGE router
- The trigger will be a route for the “source IP”s next hop ( instead of the destination IP , like the previous configuration )
- If we do not add a “deny” route-map after the first route-map, any other static routes will get redistributed into the BGP.
SYN FLOODING
- Mitigation
- TCP Intercept
- IOS CBAC/ ZBF
- PIX/ASA MPF connection limits
- SYN policing with CAR/MQC
Network scanning can be blocked by using ASA Threat detections, IPS/IDS , etc
- To drop ip options you can use the global config command : “ip options drop”, or we can drop using ACL’s ” access-list 101 deny ip any any option.”
I’m now officially done with the bootcamp. I would recommend this to everyone , when they are almost done with their Vol 1 labs. There was a big section in Day 5 about Strategies and tips to be followed during the lab and that was very insightful and i thoroughly enjoyed it
To be honest, i don’t know what exactly i wanna do for the next couple of days/ weeks. I’m stuck between Vol 2 labs (or) Go through the CCIE-sec blueprint and configure each and every item in detail and also make a list of the Doc-CD references for each.
I’ll definitely have an answer soon
.
I’m really lucky to have found an awesome support community online who continue to inspire/motivate/support me. Paul Stewart , Brian Almond and Ryan Schuett are some people i look up to someday i want to know as much as these dudes
Cheers,
TacACK
