Archive for category 90 Day countdown

T-18 | Bootcamp Final Day Review

I’m going to miss Marvin :D Here are the notes for the final day of the bootcamp .

L2 SECURITY

  • Violation modes of port-security
    • Shutdown
      • send port to err-disable
    • Protect
      • Violators cannot send traffic in , no alert is raised
    • Restrict
      • Violators cannot send traffic in
      • Generates SNMP/ Syslog
    • HSRP uses 2 MAC addresses ( NOTE )
    • During configuration, check if some traffic might inadvertantly trigger this port-security feature.
  • 2 ways to recover a port from err-disable
    • err-disable recovery configured
    • shut/no-shut
  • We can also configure a static ” Null route” a MAC address
  • When we block multicast, then some unicast/broadcast traffic also gets blocked in Storm-control ( read more on this )
  • “switchport protected” -> Mini PVLAN like configuration
  • When configuring VLAN Maps, ensure that ARP traffic is allowed ( most of the time, this is needed )
  • PVLAN requires Transparent ( VTP ) mode configuration on the switch

ATTACK MITIGATION

  • VLAN HOPPING ATTACK
    • 2 variations
      • Hosts runs DTP to form a trunk with the adjacent switch
      • Host sends frames double tagged with 802.1q
    • Mitigation
      • Ensure that all host-facing ports are statically assigned as access ports (switchport mode access )
      • Don’t ever use VLAN 1 as the default VLAN
  • CAM TABLE ATTACKS
    • port-security -> Mitigation
    • Shutting down the port is the best option
  • DHCP STARVATION ATTACKS
    • Tons of DHCP requests exhaust the DHCP pool.
    • Victim hosts are starved of a DHCP lease.
    • Could be a DOS/ MITM attack
    • Mitigation
      • DHCP Snooping
      • Ensure that all switches running a the particular VLAN have DHCP snooping turned on ( talk to the proctor )
  • ROGUE DHCP SERVER ATTACK
    • Mitigation : DHCP Snooping ( trust )
      • Can also use Port ACLs/VACLs
      • We can also use the “ip dhcp snooping Limit” command to limit the flood.
  • ARP SPOOFING
    • Gratuitous ARP -> Send ARP replies regularly without valid requests ( to refresh the ARP caches of the devices )
    • This can be a good playground to lauch MITM attacks
    • Mitigation
      • DHCP snooping with DAI
      • or ARP acls with DAI ( for static IP addressing )
      • If switches don’t support snooping or ARP inspection
        • IP ARP uses ethertype 0×806
        • IP uses Ethertype 0×800
        • This can be used to block the ARP traffic
      • Bad configuration of this can cause problems later ( reload, reboot ,etc ) . So remember, it won’t immediately show up due to ARP caching on the devices
  • MAC SPOOFING
    • Mitigation
      • IP Source guard
        • Consults the DHCP Snooping table
      • We can also use port-security
  • IP SPOOFING
    • Mitigation
      • RFC 1918/2827/3330 BOGON ingress filtering
      • uRPF
    • RFC 2827 is bidirectional
      • Traffic leaving should have the internal address
      • Traffic entering from the outside, should not have the internal address
    • uRPF takes into consideration all equal cost paths(urpf accepts both the paths as the reverse path ) into consideration when determining the interface upon which a packet should be received on . It even understands EIGRP unequal cost load-balancing.
  • SMURF/FRAGGLE ATTACK
    • Mitigation -> no ip directed broadcast
      • uRPF also does the job
      • via CAR/MQC
      • via Blackholing ( either source/destination based )

STANDARD BLACKHOLE FILTERING

  • Problem is legit traffic to the destination also gets blocked
  • Matches only by destination
  • Ensure that the “no ip unreachables” is configured on the Edge -routers

SOURCE-BASED BLACKHOLE FILTERING

  • There is a uRPF statement on the EDGE router
  • The trigger will be a route for the “source IP”s next hop ( instead of the destination IP , like the previous configuration )
  • If we do not add a “deny” route-map after the first route-map, any other static routes will get redistributed into the BGP.

SYN FLOODING

  • Mitigation
    • TCP Intercept
    • IOS CBAC/ ZBF
    • PIX/ASA MPF connection limits
    • SYN policing with CAR/MQC

Network scanning can be blocked by using ASA Threat detections, IPS/IDS , etc

  • To drop ip options you can use the global config command : “ip options drop”, or we can drop using ACL’s ” access-list 101 deny ip any any option.”

I’m now officially done with the bootcamp. I would recommend this to everyone , when they are almost done with their Vol 1 labs. There was a big section in Day 5 about Strategies and tips to be followed during the lab and that was very insightful and i thoroughly enjoyed it :)

To be honest, i don’t know what exactly i wanna do for the next couple of days/ weeks. I’m stuck between Vol 2 labs (or) Go through the CCIE-sec blueprint and configure each and every item in detail and also make a list of the Doc-CD references for each.

I’ll definitely have an answer soon :) .

I’m really lucky to have found an awesome support community online who continue to inspire/motivate/support me. Paul Stewart , Brian Almond and Ryan Schuett are some people i look up to someday i want to know as much as these dudes :)

Cheers,

TacACK

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T-19 | Bootcamp Day 4 Review

My Grandmom passed on yesterday. She was 93 and she passed away painlessly. She lived a full life and she’s with her maker. Love you gran :*

After this , i got back on the CCIE bus and i finished Day -4 of the bootcamp. Again a very productive day. Here are the notes :

MANAGEMENT – PART 1

  • Port filter service policy takes care of “early” drop of traffic to closed/ non listed ports. This ensures that the packets don’t have to go till the CPU to get dropped ( saves resources )
  • Logging type class-maps match packets that are permitted / dropped.
  • IP-options traffic is always sent to the control-plane( processor )
  • Control Plane Protection
    • host subinterface : Routing traffic destined to the router,etc
    • Transit subinterrface : Non – terminating tunnels,etc
    • CEF exception subinterface : ARP, L2 keepalives ,etc
  • Ensure that during policing , we don’t misconfigure the “burst” value (I’ve done this before :P )
  • Ensure that when configuring droppping traffic going to closed-ports, ensure that all the necessary ports that we need are open.
  • FPM
    • PHDF -> Protocol header definition file
    • If we don’t load the PHDF files, we won’t have access to the protocol structures, we have to match using offsets from L2 , L3 start, etc
    • Use nested policy maps judiciously
    • Do not change the current directory that you are working on using the “CD” command ( ‘coz after reloading you always go back to the original directory. So for “load protocol” command, use the full path of thePHDF files.

MANAGEMENT – PART 2

  • SNMP v3
    • Additional security features compared to v1 and v2
    • Version 1 , communities, ACL’s
    • Version 2 has views as a security feature
    • v3 adds the different security levels.
      • noAuthnoPriv
      • AuthNoPriv
      • AuthPriv
    • SNMP v3 has groups defined. Individual users within a group have different credentials
    • Sample config
      • access-list 99 permit 10.0.0.100
      • snmp-server view NORMVW iso included
      • snmp-server view RESTVW ifENTR.*.3 included
      • snmp-server group NORMGRP v3 priv read NORMVW write NORMVW
      • snmp-server user NORMUSER NORMGRP v3 auth sha CISCO priv des56 CISCO
    • For the write and notify views, without a view configured, we can’t access the views (unlike the “read” view which is read everything by default )
    • Notify view gets autogen after the “snmp-server host” command
    • Note : the user information doesn’t come up in the “sh run “
    • RMON
      • custom Log, trap intries based on SNMP values
      • Under the “Technologies” section of the DocCD
  • FLEXIBLE NETFLOW
    • flow monitor TEST
    • statistics packet protocol
    • statistics packet size
    • record netflow ipv4 protocol-port-tos
    • int fa 0/1
    • ip flow monitor TEST output
    • This is more granular than the old netflow ( Read more )
  • IP ACCOUNTING
    • int fa 0/1
    • ip accounting output-packets
  • ASA CAPTURE
    • Can look at traffic real-time
    • check what the order of the flow-capture events are

IPS

  • Ensure that SPAN /RSPAN is configured on the switches correctly.
  • Ensure that the RSPAN VLAN is allowed in the trunk between the swxs
  • In Inline VLAN pairs, you don’t have to configure SPAN.
  • Ensure that the traffic flow the IPS to the AAA server is allowed. ( HTTPS ACCESS )
  • Ensure that if the management network is translated, then permit that translated address in the IPS

IOS IPS

  • We use the 5.x signature formats
  • Even if the -package is present locally, don’t forget to copy it onto IDCONF
  • And remember to setup the key information prior to copying the pacage to the IDCONF
  • The ASA IPS configuration is not on the blueprint

One more day to go! :)

Cheers,

TacACK

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T-20 | Bootcamp Day 3 Review

Hey!

Day 3 of the bootcamp is DONE. :) I’m glad i started this bootcamp , ‘coz there are many things i’m learning as i go along. Here are Day 3 notes!

GETVPN

  • IP Header preservation
  • Protocols used
    • UDP 848 -> GDOI
    • Protocol 50 -> ESP
  • It keeps the original header and ecrypts only the payload
  • So the intermediate routers will see the packet with a source of the original host who sent it and the destination as the destination router ( not the IPSEC peers )
  • Make sure that we permit this traffic ( ‘coz this is a little different from theconventional VPN methodologies )
  • The concept of KS and GM’s help reduces misconfiguration.
  • In a L2L VPN, we see two separate unidirectional SPI’s in each IPsec peer, here we use 1 SPI
  • If there is a change in the SA information on the KS, then the KS can push out these configurations to the GMs immediately. It won’t till the rekey timer expires.
  • Ensure that the rekey messages are also allowed by the firewalls/routers in between the KS-GM
  • Double check rekeying
  • We need to have 2 ACL’s for each pair, for both directions.
  • The “server address” order under the GM configuration defines who is primary and who is the failover
  • GETVPN also supports multicast traffic encryption

WEBVPN & SSL VPN

  • ASA Webvn structure
      • WEBVPN
        • enable outside
        • tunnel-group-list enable
      • GROUP POLICY
      • TUNNEL GROUP
      • If using local authentication add this to the username attributes
      • username <test> attributes
        • service-type remote-access
    • TIP : Use a “sh run all”
      • SSLVPN extendeds WEVPN by allowing an SVC to be downloaded automagically.
      • Uses normal RRI / Address allocation like EZVPN
      • #webvpn
        • #enable outside
        • #tunnel-group-list enable
        • #svc image <path>
        • #svc enable
      • #group-policy
        • #vpn-tunnel-protocol webvpn
        • #split-tunel-policy..
        • #split-tunnel-network-list value [acl]
        • #webvpn
        • #svc required < Forces users to download the SVC >
      • #tunnel-group
        • #default-group-policy
  • IOS SSL VPN structure
    • GATEWAY
      • termination info, etc
      • Trustpoint
    • CONTEXT
      • Terminates VPN / establishes user session
      • contains user policies
    • POLICY GROUP
      • Set policy information
    • DEFAULT GROUP POLICY
    • Don’t forget the “inservice” commands to turn on the various configuration elements
    • Even if we don’t generate the trust point for the gateways, it would be self-generated.
    • We use the “domain” keyword after the “gateway < gateway > in the context configuration ”
      • This is used to differentiate users logging into the same gateway.
      • Suppose we use the command “gateway gateway1 domain INE”
      • Then the users connecting to the gateway will have to use ” https://<GATEWAY IP>/INE”
      • This way we can use the same gateway for more than 1 contexts
    • To turn on SVC , we use “functions svc-enabled” under the policy-group configuration
  • Ensure that in the real-lab, always use a Split tunnelling ACL when trying to connect from the Test-PC ( ‘coz if you don’t have any, you might lock yourself out )
  • Enter the “set isakmp-profile” command under the “crypto ipsec profile” configuration

AAA PASSWORDS/PRIVILEGES

  • The user needs to be at a level “higher or equal” to the command level, to be able to run it
  • “sh run” will only sh commands that you have permission to configure. This is assuming we have permission to run “sh run” to in the first place ;)
  • If we have just a “username xxx privi 7 password cisco” ( without any aaa new-model ), the user would be authenticatied and authorized locally , and he would be set at privi 7.
  • If we ‘ve configured the aaa-newmodel, then authentication and authorization is done separately.’coz separate commands are now needed.

ADVANCED AAA

  • On the actual lab, the access to the AAA server , would be via browser only ( we woulnd’t be able to RDP into it )
  • Dynamic ACLs are not scalable , “access enable” opens up all dynamic ACL
  • Using auth-proxy, per-user-ACL’s can be put into place.
  • AUTH-PROXY
    • User should be denied access via a Static ACL
    • Make sure you don’t lock yourself out after configuring “AAA authentication” . Try and insert a local fallback in the authentication command
    • Use the command “aaa authorization auth-proxy”
    • Enable the HTTP server
    • Deny all traffic inbound , except the traffic which you need to trigger the Auth-proxy
    • Specify the triggerring ACL and add it to the “auth-proxy” command, and don’t forget to turn pn auth-proxy on the interface
    • Remember the issue regarding local auth-proxy ( read blog )
    • For radius, we use the Cisco AV Pairs : “auth-proxy : priv-lvl = 15 “, etc. The only difference between RADIUS and TACACS+ is the “auth-proxy” keyword
  • CUT-THRU-PROXY
    • IN ASA , using HTTP/HTTPS , FTP , TELNET , the asa can do in-line cut-though for these protocols
    • For others, we cannot do the authentication in-stream.
    • If you wanna add ACL entries in the “outside” acl, then we need the “per-user-override” acl
    • For inside to outside, you just need the authentication, no need for acls
    • Must configure this
  • ASA-LDAP
    • Configure the LDAP server
    • aaa-server test protocol ldap
    • aaa-server test host 10.0.0.100
    • <parameters>
    • Attribute map
      • ldap attribute-map MYMAP
      • Is used to determine what group a user gets put into, based on the group-membership returned from the LDAP server
      • We then apply the LDAP attribute map to the LDAP server configuration
      • Based on the different group-policies specified in the Attribute map, we should configure different group-policies on the ASA

Next, Day 4!

Cheers,

TacACK

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T-22 | Bootcamp Day 2 Review

Done with day 2! :)   I was wrong, totally wrong, when i started the bootcamp thinking that this would not be useful . I am learning every minute of this bootcamp and i’m really happy i decided to try it out !

Here are the notes for Bootcamp- Day 2 . Hope you find it useful :)

ZONE BASED FIREWALL

  • An interface can only be in a single zone
  • Unless we have a policy on the self-zone, the default behavior is that the traffic destined to the router, is permitted
  • Traffic cannot flow between a zone-member and a non zone-member
  • The ZPF service policies have the following actiobns
    • pass -> permit unidirectional traffic
    • inspect -> stateful inspection
    • drop -> block
  • You can’t configure SPI(CBAC) and ZPF for the same set of interfaces. But you can do it for different sets
  • Auth-proxy and stuff arent supported by the ZPF, they’re still done using SPI
  • IN ZPF, if we have interface ACL’s, then the ZPF doesn’t open “pinholes’in them. If the ACL’s are configured for block, then the traffic is blocked.
  • We use a class-map of the type “inspect” to tell the IOS that this is a class-map to be used with ZPF
  • You can test by putting both the interfaces in the same-zone ( all traffic will be permitted )
  • Understand the difference between ” sh ip port-map ” and “sh ip nbar port-map”
  • By specifying an ACL at the end of the “ip port-map ” command, we can specify the destination IP which has to be accessed using the special ports
    • ex : ip port-map http port tcp 8080 list 10
  • For overriding the default port, we require a host-specific PAM mapping
    • ex : access-list 10 permit host 192.168.1.1
    • ip port-map http port 25 list 10
  • Here, only for host 192.168.1.1 , HTTP runs on tcp port 25
  • After I finished this section, I read this document. It was very helpfulJ http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_data_plane/configuration/guide/sec_zone_polcy_firew_ps6441_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html#wp1055217

IPSEC VPNs

  • Why IPSec VPNs over other type of VPNs?
    • Does not need static SP provisioning like FR/ATM/MPLS
    • Independant of SP access method
    • Allows both site-to-site and remote-accesss ( IPsec is always on, v/s dial-on-demand )
    • Data is protected. ( main motivation )
  • IPSec as a suite offers
    • Data origin authentication
    • Data integrity
    • Data confidentiality
    • Anti-replay
  • The advantage of using UDP 500 for both the source and destination ports, is useful during NAT-D
  • ISAKMP peers must agree on
    • Authentication method
    • Encryption type
    • hash algo
    • DH group
  • Lifetimes need not match ( the lower one is dynamically chosen )
  • Remember, the phase 1 config is only used to setup a secure channel through the network for the exchange of IPSec configuration data.
  • Default policy : 65535
  • IPSec peers ( IPSec sa a.k.a IKE Phase 2 ) must agree on
    • Transform set to match
    • In an L2L Vpn, the VPN_ACLs are exchanged and they need to match.( they need to be mirror images of each other )
  • Do not use “any any” for the ACL. Always try and specify the exact networks
  • IPSec SA rekeying can also include PFS
    • Runs another DH exchange ( more secure )
  • During configuration on the lab, make sure that the traffic ( both UDP 500 and ESP ) between the 2 VPN routers passes freely .( take care of any Firewalls , IOS FW , SPI configured in previous tasks )
  • Ensure that we can have the VPN initiate from both sides ( testing before moving on to the next task. If you have a doubt, as the proctor )
  • Certificate based authentication
    • If Certificate based Authentictation is’nt working, try doing PSK auth and see if it works
    • When using certificates for ISAKMP authentication, ensure that CA server (port 80) is reachable by the clients and ensure that the time is synced.
    • If you don’t have NTP, ensure that the client is set to a time, slightly ahead of the server. ( if you can’t exactly sync them )
    • Also check the time-zones

MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES

  • Advantage of using GRE for VPN’s -> passing multicast(routing) traffic
  • Disadvantage -> Overhead
  • Solution -> VTI
    • also better interop with other vendors not supporting GRE
    • less overhead
  • Dynamic VTI
    • virtual template configured with interface type “tunnel”
    • The virtual template acts as a logical interface
  • In case of ZBF, the virtual template can be assigned to zones ( this just acts like a normal interface )
  • IPSEC HA
    • Link resiliency
      • If i have 2 devices, and 2 links between them, if one fails, traffic can flow through the other links
    • Backup peers
      • if one peer fails, the secondary peer is used
    • HSRP / RRI
      • if this is configured, then the HSRP address is used instead of the peer IP.
    • GRE w/IPSEC, dynamic routing
  • QOS for VPN
    • QOS for encrypted traffic
      • This is the default type of QOS
    • QOS for unencrypted traffic
      • we use the QOS pre-classify configured on the virtual template, crypto map or GRE tunnel to classify the traffic prior to encryption
  • We can encrypt the ISAKMP keys ( to prevent them from being seen in the running-config in plaintext)
    • “password encryption aes”
    • “key config-key password-encrypt”
  • Encrypts the ISAKMP keys using Type-6 AES
  • We can also configure Certificate MAPS to ignore revocation checks as well as expired certificates. This can be configured when we “match” the certificate MAP under the trustpoint
    • match certificate TEST allow expired-certificate
    • match certificate TEST skip revocation-check
  • This scenario is useful when the CA to be used by one peer is behind the remote-peer and it can be reached only after establishing the VPN
  • In this situation, we can configure the certificate MAP to allow expired-certificates,ignore revocation checks
  • Clearing the DF bit
    • We can set/clear the DF bit on the IPSec traffic ( to allow/deny fragmentation of the traffic )
    • This is for the traffic passing through the Router
    • can be done globally or on an interface
  • Fragmentation
    • We can fragment before/after we encrypt
      • Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption
        • if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks
          • crypto ipsec fragmentation before-encryption
        • if we fragment after encryption, then the other end ( remote peer ) has to do both reassembly and decryption
          • crypto ipsec fragmentation after-encryption
  • Anti-replay
    • Keeps track of sequence numbers. Default window size is 64
    • crypto ipsec security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]
    • (or )
    • crypto map MYMAP
      • set security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]

DMVPN

  • It allows an on-demand full mesh IPSec tunnels
  • Instead of n*(n-1)/2 static tunnel configurations, we have 1 mGRE interface for all connections
  • Always remember, ISAKMP Phase 1 is still required.
  • In case of the HUB mgre interface, we have Tunnel source.
  • If we wanna force all the spokes to send traffic through the HUB ( DMVPN type 1 ) , then we can also specify the tunnel destination
  • The IGP which we will be using here is an OVERLAY network ( independant of the real routing protocols running in the network )
  • If you’re using OSPF , use the same network types for the hubs and the spokes
    • if there is a DR election, ensure that the Hub becomes the DR.
    • This is achieved by setting the “priority” to 0 on the spokes.
  • With EIGRP
    • One of the issues is split-horizon , on the mgre interface . Issue the “no ip split-horizon eigrp # “
    • Hub by default re-writes the next-hop for all the advertised routes to itself.
    • So if we want spoke-to-spoke tunnels, disable this feature by using ” no ip next-hop-self eigrp # “
  • Phase 3 DMVPN
    • Configuration
      • ip nhrp redirect
      • ip nhrp shortcut
    • creates NHRP entries for remote networks
  • Interesting traffic
    • we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )
      • ip nhrp interest 101
  • Groups
    • ip nhrp group A ( spoke )
    • ip nhrp map group A service-policy output TEST ( hub )
    • can have separate service policies configured outbound for different hosts.
  • Watch out for recursive routing issues.

Day 3 , here i come!

Cheers,

TacACK

terface can only be in a single zone

Unless we have a policy on the self-zone, the default behavior is that the traffic destined to the router, is permitted

Traffic cannot flow between a zone-member and a non zone-member

The ZPF service policies have the following actiobns

pass -> permit unidirectional traffic

inspect -> stateful inspection

drop -> block

You can’t configure SPI(CBAC) and ZPF for the same set of interfaces. But you can do it for different sets

Auth-proxy and stuff arent supported by the ZPF, they’re still done using SPI

IN ZPF, if we have interface ACL’s, then the ZPF doesn’t open “pinholes’in them. If the ACL’s are configured for block, then the traffic is blocked.

We use a class-map of the type “inspect” to tell the IOS that this is a class-map to be used with ZPF

You can test by putting both the interfaces in the same-zone ( all traffic will be permitted )

Understand the difference between ” sh ip port-map ” and “sh ip nbar port-map”

By specifying an ACL at the end of the “ip port-map ” command, we can specify the destination IP which has to be accessed using the special ports

ex : ip port-map http port tcp 8080 list 10

For overriding the default port, we require a host-specific PAM mapping

ex : access-list 10 permit host 192.168.1.1

#ip port-map http port 25 list 10

Here, only for host 192.168.1.1 , HTTP runs on tcp port 25

Reading http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_data_plane/configuration/guide/sec_zone_polcy_firew_ps6441_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html#wp1055217 now

IPSEC VPNs

Why IPSec VPNs over other type of VPNs?

Does not need static SP provisioning like FR/ATM/MPLS

Independant of SP access method

Allows both site-to-site and remote-accesss ( IPsec is always on, v/s dial-on-demand )

Data is protected. ( main motivation )

IPSec as a suite offers

Data origin authentication

Data integrity

Data confidentiality

Anti-replay

The advantage of using UDP 500 for both the source and destination ports, is useful during NAT-D

ISAKMP peers must agree on

Authentication method

Encryption type

hash algo

DH group

Lifetimes need not match ( the lower one is dynamically chosen )

Remember, the phase 1 config is only used to setup a secure channel through the network for the exchange of IPSec configuration data.

Default policy : 65535

IPSec peers ( IPSec sa a.k.a IKE Phase 2 ) must agree on

Transform set to match

In an L2L Vpn, the VPN_ACLs are exchanged and they need to match.( they need to be mirror images of each other )

Do not use “any any” for the ACL. Always try and specify the exact networks

IPSec SA rekeying can also include PFS

Runs another DH exchange ( more secure )

During configuration on the lab, make sure that the traffic ( both UDP 500 and ESP ) between the 2 VPN routers passes freely .( take care of any Firewalls , IOS FW , SPI configured in previous tasks )

Ensure that we can have the VPN initiate from both sides ( testing before moving on to the next task. If you have a doubt, as the proctor )

Certificate based authentication

If Certificate based Authentictation is’nt working, try doing PSK auth and see if it works

When using certificates for ISAKMP authentication, ensure that CA server (port 80) is reachable by the clients and ensure that the time is synced.

If you don’t have NTP, ensure that the client is set to a time, slightly ahead of the server. ( if you can’t exactly sync them )

Also check the time-zones

MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES

Advantage of using GRE for VPN’s -> passing multicast(routing) traffic

Disadvantage -> Overhead

Solution -> VTI

also better interop with other vendors not supporting GRE

less overhead

Dynamic VTI

virtual template configured with interface type “tunnel”

The virtual template acts as a logical interface

In case of ZBF, the virtual template can be assigned to zones ( this just acts like a normal interface )

IPSEC HA

Link resiliency

If i have 2 devices, and 2 links between them, if one fails, traffic can flow through the other links

Backup peers

if one peer fails, the secondary peer is used

HSRP / RRI

if this is configured, then the HSRP address is used instead of the peer IP.

GRE w/IPSEC, dynamic routing

QOS for VPN

QOS for encrypted traffic

This is the default type of QOS

QOS for unencrypted traffic

we use the QOS pre-classify configured on the virtual template, crypto map or GRE tunnel

We can encrypt the ISAKMP keys ( to prevent them from being seen in the running-config in plaintext)

“password encryption aes”

“key config-key password-encrypt”

Encrypts the ISAKMP keys using Type-6 AES

We can also configure Certificate MAPS to ignore revocation checks as well as expired certificates. This can be configured when we “match” the certificate MAP under the trustpoint

match certificate TEST allow expired-certificate

match certificate TEST skip revocation-check

This scenario is useful when the CA to be used by one peer is behind the remote-peer and it can be reached only after establishing the VPN

In this situation, we can configure the certificate MAP to allow expired-certificates,ignore revocation checks

Clearing the DF bit

We can set/clear the DF bit on the IPSec traffic ( to allow/deny fragmentation of the traffic )

This is for the traffic passing through the Router

can be done globally or on an interface

Fragmentation

We can fragment before/after we encrypt

Depends on who has to do the reassembly / decryption

if we fragment before encryption, at the other end the little fragmented packets get decypted and sent on to the remote-networks

crypto ipsec fragmentation before-encryption

if we fragment after encryption, then the other end ( remote peer ) has to do both reassembly and decryption

crypto ipsec fragmentation after-encryption

Anti-replay

Keeps track of sequence numbers. Default window size is 64

crypto ipsec security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]

(or )

crypto map MYMAP

set security-association replay [disable | window size XX ]

DMVPN

It allows an on-demand full mesh IPSec tunnels

Instead of n*(n-1)/2 static tunnel configurations, we have 1 mGRE interface for all connections

Always remember, ISAKMP Phase 1 is still required.

In case of the HUB mgre interface, we have Tunnel source.

If we wanna force all the spokes to send traffic through the HUB ( DMVPN type 1 ) , then we can also specify the tunnel destination

The IGP which we will be using here is an OVERLAY network ( independant of the real routing protocols running in the network )

If you’re using OSPF , use the same network types for the hubs and the spokes

if there is a DR election, ensure that the Hub becomes the DR.

This is achieved by setting the “priority” to 0 on the spokes.

With EIGRP

One of the issues is split-horizon , on the mgre interface . Issue the “no ip split-horizon eigrp # “

Hub by default re-writes the next-hop for all the advertised routes to itself.

So if we want spoke-to-spoke tunnels, disable this feature by using ” no ip next-hop-self eigrp # “

Phase 3 DMVPN

Configuration

ip nhrp redirect

ip nhrp shortcut

creates NHRP entries for remote networks

Interesting traffic

we can define an ACL on the tunnel interface, this sets up interesting traffic for the NHRP requests ( restricting what traffic can bring up a spoke-spoke tunnel )

ip nhrp interest 101

Groups

ip nhrp group A ( spoke )

ip nhrp map group A service-policy output TEST ( hub )

can have separate service policies configured outbound for different hosts.

Watch out for recursive routing issues.

Right on! Done with Day 2 of the Bootcamp. Was pretty good..definitely exceeded my expectations. Can’t wait for tomorrow! :)

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T-23 | Bootcamp Day 1 review

Hello all!
I’m really excited! ‘coz i’m finally doing the bootcamps that i purchased a couple of months back :) . I started the bootcamp yesterday and i went through Day 1 and i took notes on WAVE.I must say, i was pleasantly surprised by the content covered on the first day. I expected it to be very basic, but Marvin did dive into some advanced stuff ( but no configuration :( ).

Here are the notes and i hope you find them useful :

ASA

  • Make sure you don’t block traffic flows as we configure tasks ( don’t screw up earlier tasks )
  • Marvin’s of the opinion that it’ll mostly be 8.0 running on the ASA on the lab
  • It’s a good idea to read through the lab once before we start configuring ( helpful in changing firewall modes, contexts ,etc )
  • Add a “description” on the catalysts if necessary ( to identify the interfaces connected to the switch ). Make this a habit. ( helps )
  • Redundant interfaces
    • Multiple interfaces grouped together
    • order of configuration determines preference
  • We can use both Subinterfaces and the real interface on the ASA. In case of the sub-interfaces ( e 0/1.100 VLAN 100 ), the ASA would send the packets with a dot1q tag on, in case of the interface with the actual interface ( ex : e 0/1 ), it would send it untagged.
    • So we have to program the switch to accept untagged packets in the trunk link. This can be done using native-vlans.
  • Addresses, protocols and ports can be found under the “references section” of any Configuration guide for 8.X . This is cool!
  • Draw out network flows for protocols running in the network to visualize what needs to be allowed.
  • Routing protocols
    • ASA supports the following routing protocols :
      • static
      • Rip v1/v2
      • OSPF
      • EIGRP
    • Different OSPF areas in a firewall, can be configured under a signle process or multiple processes
    • Configuring them under one process will alow routing information to pass from one OSPF area to the other freely
    • configuring them as 2 separate processes, will logically isolate the areas. To exchange routes, we need to explicitly redistribute.
    • So be careful when you configure them under 1/separate OSPF processes.
    • Having an exact OSPF match, can be a good thing to check if we have configured the addresses correctly.
  • NAT
    • Nat 0 -> Nat exemption
    • Options in NAT configuration
      • TCP/UDP maximum connection limits
      • TCP Half-open connections
      • DNS rewrite
      • Disable randomizing sequence numbers
    • By default, NAT-control is disabled.
    • NAT-control only applies for traffic between 2 interfaces of “different” security levels.
  • In transparent firewall, TCP , UDP traffic is inspected by default
  • “allocate-interface redundant1.3 int1
  • There are sample ASA configurations under the “references”section in the ASA configuration guides! -> AWESOME!
  • Good practice is to save the config in a notepad file before we start Failover configuration.

IOS F/w

  • The log-input command in ACL logging , logs the following info
    • list name/number
    • permit/deny
    • protocol name/number
    • source/destination IP
    • port numbers
    • MAC addresses
    • Input VC
  • The first 5 are also logged when you do the “log” option instead of log-input
  • The routing protocols use a “distribute-list” to filter routes
  • The autocommand for Dynamic ACL’s configured on the LINE VTY 0 4 lines, blocks also legitimate management traffic
  • By using the “host” keyword, the “any” in the source address portion of the ACL is replaced by the host that underwent the authentication.
  • Thing to remember is “reflexive” ACL’s don’t wory for locally generated trarffic
  • So we need to statically permit required traffic back in
  • or configure local policy-routing
  • we can use the “router-traffic” keyword in the CBAC inspect commands, to inspect locally generated traffic

I’m going to be starting Day 2 of the bootcamp in about 30 mins . Surf with me on the WAVE :)

Cheers,

TacACK

BOOTCAMP – DAY 1

Here we go! :) I’m not a fan of the INE bootcamp, but just ‘coz i’ve paid for it, i’m gonna give it a good once over!

ASA

  • Make sure you don’t block traffic flows as we configure tasks ( don’t screw up earlier tasks )
  • Marvin’s of the opinion that it’ll mostly be 8.0 running on the ASA on the lab
  • It’s a good idea to read through the lab once before we start configuring ( helpful in changing firewall modes, contexts ,etc )
  • Add a “description” on the catalysts if necessary ( to identify the interfaces connected to the switch ). Make this a habit. ( helps )
  • Redundant interfaces
  • Multiple interfaces grouped together
  • order of configuration determines preference
  • We can use both Subinterfaces and the real interface on the ASA. In case of the sub-interfaces ( e 0/1.100 VLAN 100 ), the ASA would send the packets with a dot1q tag on, in case of the interface with the actual interface ( ex : e 0/1 ), it would send it untagged.
  • So we have to program the switch to accept untagged packets in the trunk link. This can be done using native-vlans.
  • Addresses, protocols and ports can be found under the “references section” of any Configuration guide for 8.X . This is cool!
  • Draw out network flows for protocols running in the network to visualize what needs to be allowed.
  • Routing protocols
  • ASA supports the following routing protocols :
  • static
  • Rip v1/v2
  • OSPF
  • EIGRP
  • Different OSPF areas in a firewall, can be configured under a signle process or multiple processes
  • Configuring them under one process will alow routing information to pass from one OSPF area to the other freely
  • configuring them as 2 separate processes, will logically isolate the areas. To exchange routes, we need to explicitly redistribute.
  • So be careful when you configure them under 1/separate OSPF processes.
  • Having an exact OSPF match, can be a good thing to check if we have configured the addresses correctly.
  • NAT
  • Nat 0 -> Nat exemption
  • Options in NAT configuration
  • TCP/UDP maximum connection limits
  • TCP Half-open connections
  • DNS rewrite
  • Disable randomizing sequence numbers
  • By default, NAT-control is disabled.
  • NAT-control only applies for traffic between 2 interfaces of “different” security levels.
  • In transparent firewall, TCP , UDP traffic is inspected by default
  • allocate-interface redundant1.3 int1 (alias)
  • There are sample ASA configurations under the “references”section in the ASA configuration guides! -> AWESOME!
  • Good practice is to save the config in a notepad file before we start Failover configuration.

IOS F/w

  • the log-input command in ACL logging gets the following info
  • list name/number
  • permit/deny
  • protocol name/number
  • source/destination IP
  • port numbers
  • MAC addresses
  • Input VC
  • The first 5 are also logged when you do the “log” option instead of log-input
  • The routing protocols use a “distribute-list” to filter routes
  • The autocommand for Dynamic ACL’s configured on the LINE VTY 0 4 lines, blocks also legitimate management traffic
  • The “host” keyword, the “any” in the source address portion of the ACL is replaced by the host that did the authentication
  • Thing to remember is “reflexive” ACL’s don’t wory for locally generated trarffic
  • So we need to statically permit required traffic back in
  • or configure local policy-routing
  • we can use the “router-traffic” keyword in the CBAC inspect commands, to inspect locally generated traffic

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